PRYOR V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
153 F. Supp. 2D 710 (E. D. PA. 2001)* by unknown
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 13
Spring 4-1-2002
PRYOR V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 153 F. Supp. 2D 710
(E. D. PA. 2001)*
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice at Washington & Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an
authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
PRYOR V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 153 F. Supp. 2D 710 (E. D. PA. 2001)*, 8 Wash. & Lee Race &
Ethnic Anc. L. J. 143 (2002).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol8/iss1/13
PRYOR V. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
153 F. Supp. 2D 710 (E. D. PA. 2001)*
FACTS
Plaintiffs, Kelly Pryor ("Pryor") and Warren Spivey, Jr. ("Spivey"), are
African-American student-athletes.' San Jose State University ("SJSU")
recruited Pryor to play soccer and she signed a National Letter of Intent
("NLI") finalizing her decision to attend SJSU beginning in the fall of 1999.2
Spivey signed a NLI with the University of Connecticut to play football
beginning in the fall of 1999.' The NLIs required the students to satisfy the
freshman eligibility requirements of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association's ("NCAA") Proposition 16 ("Prop 16") in order to receive
athletic scholarships and participate in intercollegiate athletics.4 Both Pryor
and Spivey failed to meet the requirements of Prop 16 and the NCAA denied
them full qualifier status.5
In 1992 the NCAA passed Prop 16, which took effect in 1996.6 Prop 16
sets forth an "initial-eligibility index" for student-athletes who seek to
participate in intercollegiate athletics at a NCAA-affiliated college or
university.7 Prior to Prop 16, athletic eligibility requirements focused
primarily on standardized test scores provided by the Scholastic Aptitude Test
("SAT") and the American College Test ("ACT").' The "initial-eligibility
index," set forth in NCAA Bylaw § 14.3.1.1.1, 9 creates a sliding scale based
on standardized test performance and grade point average ("GPA")."° A
student-athlete may establish eligibility as a full qualifier with a 2.0 GPA in
thirteen core courses, provided he or she also obtains SAT scores of 1010 (or
* At the time of writing, plaintiffs had appealed this case. On May 6, 2002, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in Pryor v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 8745. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court and held that
plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim for purposeful racial discrimination under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The court affirmed the District Court's holding that Pryor lacked standing to prosecute
her discrimination claims under the ADA. Although this case note has been largely overturned, we publish
this for its cogent analysis of the District Court's opinion and its criticisms of Proposition 16.
1. Pryor v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 153 F. Supp. 2d 710,712 (E.D. Pa. 2001).




6. Lee J. Rosen, Proposition 16 and the NCAA Initial-Eligibility Standards: Putting the Student
back in the Student-Athlete, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 175, 182 (2000).
7. Id. at 182-83.
8. Id. at 180.
9. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Bylaw Article 14, Eligibility: Academic and General
Requirements, § 14.3. 1. 1.1 (August 1,2001).
10. Id.
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a combined ACT score of 86)." Alternatively, a student-athlete who received
a SAT score of 820 (or 68 ACT) is eligible provided he maintained a GPA of
at least 2.5.2
Due to Pryor's learning disability, the NCAA qualified her as a learning-
disabled student-athlete and allowed her to seek a waiver of its decision. 3 On
review, the NCAA deemed Pryor to be a partial qualifier.'4 A partial qualifier
is a student who does not meet the requirements for a full qualifier but who,
at the time of graduation from high school, has scored at least a 720 on the
SAT (or a combined ACT score of 59) combined with a GPA of 2.750; or,
alternatively, a student-athlete who received a SAT score of 810 provided he
maintained a GPA of 2.525." As a partial qualifier, Pryor kept her athletic
scholarship and could practice with the soccer team, but could not compete
during her freshman year. 6 The University of Connecticut applied for a
waiver on Spivey's behalf on the grounds that he was also a learning-disabled
student-athlete, but the NCAA denied the application. 7 Therefore, Spivey
could not receive athletic financial aid or participate in intercollegiate athletics
during his freshman year.'
Prop 16 permitted Pryor and Spivey to participate in college athletics in
their second year if their academic performance during their first year met
specified standards.' 9 The NCAA allows member-schools to set the minimum
standards for qualification to compete after the first year, with each school
setting its own definition for "satisfactory academic progress."2 Also, the
NCAA passed Bylaw 14.3.3.2 in August 1999 that granted learning disabled
student-athletes, nonqualifiers and partial qualifiers five years to use their four
years of college athletic eligibility.2' Plaintiffs have not, as of yet, sought to
obtain this additional year in which to use their eligibility.
2
After finishing their freshman years, plaintiffs filed claims with the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 3 They alleged racial
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Pryor, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
14. Id.
15. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Bylaw Article 14 Eligibility: Academic and General
Requirements, § 14.3.2.1 (August I, 2001).




20. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Bylaw Article 14, Eligibility: Academic and General
Requirements, § 14.4.1 (August I, 2001).
21. Pryor, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (referring to National Collegiate Athletic Association, Bylaw
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discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196424 asserting that
the NCAA purposefully discriminated against them by intentionally designing
and implementing eligibility criteria that have a disparate impact on racial
25minorities. Plaintiffs also claimed that the NCAA's indifference to the
effects of Prop 16 constituted purposeful discrimination.
26
Pryor also filed separate claims alleging discrimination on the basis of her
learning disability under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act.27 She alleged that the NCAA
discriminates against learning-disabled athletes by denying them the
opportunity to participate in athletics at Division I schools.
28
The NCAA moved for summary judgment.29  The Court treated the
NCAA's motion as a motion to dismiss in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). 3' Because the plaintiffs' claims did not survive the Court's review
under 12(b)(6), the Court did not reach the question of whether a motion for
summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 would be appropriate.3
The language of Rule 12(b)(6) provides that, in response to a pleading, a
defendant may raise the defense of "failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted" by motion.32 In considering such a motion, the court must
only consider the facts alleged in the complaint.3 3 Additionally, the court must
take all well-pled facts in the complaint as true and view them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff.34 The plaintiff must "provide sufficient information
to outline the elements of the claim, or to permit inferences to be drawn that
these elements exist."35 Ultimately, a complaint will be dismissed if"it is clear
that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved
consistent with the allegations."36
HOLDING
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994).
25. Pryor, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
26. Id.
27. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 7 94 et seq. (1999); 4 2 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1995).
28. Pryor, 153 F. Sup. 2d at 713.
29. Id. at 711.
30. Id. at 712.
31. Id.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6).
33. Pryor, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (citing ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir.
1994)).
34. Id. at 713 (citing Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411,421 (1969)).
35. Id. (citing Kost v. Kozakiewicz, I F.3d 176, 183 (3d. Cir. 1993)).
36. Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
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granted the NCAA's motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for the NCAA's
motion for summary judgment in its entirety." The Court dismissed Pryor's
claims under the American's With Disabilities Act,38 the Rehabilitation Act,39
and Title V140 with prejudice. 4' The Court also dismissed with prejudice Pryor
and Spivey's § 198 142 claims of race discrimination.
4 3
ANALYSIS
The Court evaluated Pryor's claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Rehabilitation Act together.' The NCAA argued that Pryor
lacked standing to bring these claims and the Court agreed.45
In order to have standing, a plaintiff must allege an actual case or
controversy for which the Court can grant relief.46 Pryor had to satisfy three
prongs: (1) injury in fact (a concrete harm suffered by plaintiff that is actual
or imminent), (2) causation, and (3) redressibility.
47
Pryor argued that the NCAA's process for evaluating the eligibility of
learning disabled students weighs academic indicators such as standardized
achievement tests too heavily.48 She claimed that these tests did not accurately
represent the abilities of learning-disabled individuals.49 She also argued that
the NCAA unjustly denied her full qualifier status.5 As a partial qualifier she
was unable to compete in athletic events during her freshman year, although
she still received scholarship money.5 In addition, Pryor claimed that the
waiver process in Prop 16 is itself inadequate to accommodate learning
disabled students.52 The court determined that these allegations were sufficient
for Pryor to meet the first two prongs of the test for standing analysis.53
The Court, however, determined that Pryor failed to show redressibility,
the third prong of the standing analysis.5 4 Before Pryor filed her claim, the
37. Id. at 718.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq. (2002).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
41. Pryor, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
43. Pryor, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
44. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq.
45. Pryor, 153 F. Supp. 2dat 718.
46. Id.







54. Id. at 714.
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NCAA had passed Bylaw § 14.3.3.2,"1 that provided Pryor with another year
of eligibility.56 Therefore, Pryor still had four years of athletic eligibility and
did not suffer an injury by being unable to compete during her freshman
year." Pryor argued that even under Bylaw § 14.3.3.2 the procedures that
learning disabled students must follow to obtain their fourth year of eligibility
are different from the procedures that non-disabled students must follow.58
Pryor claimed that she must "earn back" her fourth year whereas a physically-
injured athlete, for instance, would automatically recover the year.59 Pryor
argued that this discrepancy is evidence of the continuing adverse effects of
Prop 16.60 The court held that even if this description was true, Pryor did not
raise any of these concerns in her complaint.6' The court concluded that she
had no injury to be redressed, and she therefore failed to establish the third
prong of the standing analysis.62 For the same reasons, the court granted the
NCAA's motion to dismiss Pryor's claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.63
Plaintiffs' claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were that
the NCAA purposefully discriminated against them by intentionally designing
and implementing the eligibility criteria in Prop 16 to have a disparate impact
on racial minorities.' They further alleged that the NCAA's deliberate
indifference to Prop 16's effects constitutes purposeful discrimination.65
In order to invoke Title VI, a plaintiff must show that a defendant receives
federal funds.66 The plaintiffs described the NCAA's relationship with the
National Youth Sports Program (NYSP) and the National Youth Sports
Program Fund.67 Before its recent reorganization, the NCAA controlled a part
of NYSP which received federal funds from the United States Department of
Health and Human Services.68 The Third Circuit, in Cureton v. NCAA,69 found
this relationship to be insufficient to establish the NCAA as a recipient of
55. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Bylaw Article 14 Eligibility: Academic and General
Requirements, § 14.3.3.2 (August 1, 2001).






62. Id. at 715.
63. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 794 etseq.; 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq.
64. Pryor, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 715. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
65. Pryor, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
66. Id. (citing Guardian Ass'n v. Civil Service, Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1999).
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federal funding.7° In Cureton, the Third Circuit held that only programs
directly receiving federal funding could be held liable for disparate impact
under Title VI.? The Court in the present case distinguished Cureton, noting
that where there is a claim of intentional discrimination, an organization can
be considered a recipient of federal funds on an institution-wide basis.72 If
plaintiffs prove their claims of intentional discrimination, the NCAA may be
held liable due to the indirect receipt of federal funding from the NYSP.73
The Court then addressed the next prong of the Title VI analysis looking
at whether the plaintiffs' basis for alleging intentional discrimination was
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.74 The Plaintiffs argued that they
could prove intentional discrimination: (1) by showing that discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor in the development and adoption of Prop 16,
and (2) by showing that the NCAA was deliberately indifferent to the disparate
impact of Prop 16.7' The Court held that Title VI does not provide a basis for
a claim where a federally funded entity knowingly implements regulations
which create a racially or ethnically disparate impact, therefore, plaintiffs'
argument that they can show the NCAA was deliberately indifferent to a
disparate impact fails.7 6 With respect to plaintiffs' discriminatory motive
argument, the Court stated that the standard for measuring discriminatory
motive is that the policy must be adopted "'because of' not merely 'in spite of
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 7
The Court did not find that the NCAA created Prop 16 with the intent to
achieve a racially disparate impact, but perhaps created one incidentally.
78
Even so, the Court held that the NCAA's awareness of an effect does not raise
its conduct to the level of purposeful discrimination. 79 The Third Circuit had
addressed the same issue in Cureton where it found that simply monitoring the
effects its rules have upon black student-athletes does not suggest that the
NCAA improperly considered race either in the promulgation or continued
enforcement of Prop 16.8 The Court found the plaintiffs' allegations of
intentional discrimination failed to state a claim under Title VI and granted the
NCAA's motion to dismiss.8 '
70. Pryor, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
71. Id. (referring to Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 716.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001)).
77. Id (citing Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1996)).
78. Id.
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With regard to the plaintiffs' claim for racial discrimination under § 1981,
the court found that the plaintiffs were the cause of any breach of contract that
may have occurred because they failed to satisfy conditions they knowingly
accepted when they signed their NLIs. 2 Plaintiffs had alleged that Prop 16
denied them the opportunity to make and perform contracts, NLIs, and hence
the ability to participate in college athletics and receive related financial aid.83
To bring a claim under § 1981 the plaintiffs would have had to: (1) establish
that they were members of a racial minority, (2) establish that the NCAA
intended to discriminate against them on the basis of race, and (3) establish
that the NCAA's discrimination concerned an activity protected under the
statute such as the right to enter into a contract and enjoy its benefits. 4 The
plaintiffs satisfied the first prong. 5 They failed the second prong which
required a showing of intentional discrimination. 6 As to the third prong, the
Court found that the plaintiffs were able to make contracts by signing the
letters of intent.87 Therefore, the remaining question was whether Prop 16
interfered with their ability to enjoy the benefits of these contracts. 8 The
Court held that the plaintiffs knew the conditions of signing the NLIs (the
GPA and ACT/SAT requirements), and could not now, after failing to meet the
conditions, argue that the contracts were invalid. 9
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs' opportunity to mount a challenge against Prop 16 fell when
the district court deferred to precedent. The court determined that Title VI
offers no private cause of action for regulations that create a racially or
ethnically disparate impact unless there is a showing of intentional
discrimination. On this point, plaintiffs' argument that the NCAA
intentionally discriminated by showing deliberate indifference to a disparate
impact, their strongest argument, was effectively eliminated. They were left
with trying to claim the NCAA instituted Prop 16 with the specific purpose of
discriminating against minorities, an argument for which they had no factual
support. Though the Court correctly analyzed the case with respect to NCAA
regulations, applicable statutes, and precedent, they failed to forge any new
ground with respect to racial equality. Unless future plaintiffs find a cause of
82. Id. at 718.
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action or a court that will find intent in the NCAA's indifference to the
disparate impact that Prop 16 has, the courts will continue to find in favor of
the NCAA, and minority student-athletes will need to find other channels to
change the standards of Prop 16.
Critics of Prop 16 say it is unfair because of its disparate impact on
minorities and athletes from lower-income families.9" In fact, there has been
so much criticism that the NCAA's academic cabinet is considering implement
changes to Prop 16 as early as 2003. 9" Some critics are not so sure the NCAA
rules should be redrawn.92 The NCAA cabinet is looking at adjustments that
would weight a student-athlete's grade point average more heavily.93 Prop 16
was enacted to improve athletes' graduation rates, and it may have
accomplished this objective, but the athletic community needs a better method
for accomplishing this goal.94 The graduation rate may be higher since the
institution of Prop 16 because they have simply weeded out poor students who
brought the rate down. Prop 16 has done nothing to help more students
graduate, but has instead excluded students with lower test scores, creating the
appearance of a higher graduation rate. If athlete graduation is the concern,
schools could use stricter requirements for performance after an athlete begins
college. Prop 16 may produce better first year college academic performance,
but the accompanying discrimination is too great.
The NCAA is the most likely source of change. If the NCAA were to
revise Prop 16 with the purpose of effectuating racial equality, the inequality
of standardized tests should be taken into account. The discrepancy between
standardized test scores for African-Americans and for whites is notable. 95
African-Americans, on average, score over 4 points lower than whites on the
ACT, and about 100 points lower on the SAT.96 Studies have sought to
explain these gaps in test scores. The most prominent finding is the tie
between the quality of education and the test result.97 Because so many
African-Americans live in urban areas and attend inner-city schools where the
quality of education is lower, they are not trained to test well on national
90. J.M. Porter, Judge dismisses Prop 16 Challenge, USA TODAY, July 10, 2001, at C9.
91. Steve Weiberg, NCAA is ready to revise academic eligibility statute, USA TODAY, July 5,2001,
at CI.
92. Steve Vedder, Local officials against changing NCAA rules, THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July
12, 2001, at (no page reference available).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. MEASURING UP: CHALLENGES MINORITIES FACE IN EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT 4-5 (Arie L.
Nettles & Michael T. Nettles, eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999).
96. Id.
97. PETER SACKS, STANDARDIZED MINDS: THE HIGH PRICE OF AMERICA'S TESTING CULTURE AND
WHAT WE CAN DO TO CHANGE IT 8-9 (Perseus Books 1999).
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standardized tests such as the SAT and ACT.98 One study suggested that
African-Americans use the right side of the brain in thinking about the world,
while whites use the left side of the brain, which is more apt to "process
information sequentially and computer-like," similar to what is required on a
standardized test.99
In legislating Prop 16 the NCAA may not have sought to purposefully
discriminate against African-Americans, but they failed to answer the
discrepancies that exist when using standardized test scores. In the future,
when revising the propositions the NCAA should look at these studies and use
their lawmaking power as a tool for social equality. They have hinted at
taking more emphasis off standardized tests and putting more emphasis on
GPA.1 ° Why not remove the role of standardized tests altogether, and use
GPA as the sole standard? This has been done in school admission processes
with noted success.' 0'
The District Court's distinction between regulations "intended" to have a
racially disparate impact and regulations that "incidentally create one" is the
main obstacle for plaintiffs challenging Prop 16's requirements. Though the
Court has offered little hope, those seeking to challenge Prop 16 in the courts
are not giving up. Following the court's second dismissal of a legal challenge
to the eligibility criteria of Prop 16, Pryor and Spivey's attorney, Andre
Dennis, who also represented the plaintiff in Cureton said, "We still believe
in this action. We still believe in this case."'0 2
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Justin E. Pingel
98. Id.
99. Id. at 218-219.
100. Weiberg, supra note 92, at C1.
101. SACKS, supra note 98, at 306-307.
102. Porter, suspra note 91, at C9.
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